Brazil is a country with long-standing ambitions for a major role in the world economy and in global governance, but its footprint in various measures of both remains relatively modest.
On current trends, the gap between ambition and achievement will likely remain large, so we provide a critique of Brazil's strategy in terms of economic statecraft; reflect on the wisdom of choices made in the past in terms of multilateralism vs. regionalism; and suggest a new approach that could enhance Brazil's leadership role at the regional and global levels. It would involve the Brazilian government and business elites making clearer and more daring national choices, including shedding increasingly arcane and detrimental strategic alliances, in order to enable the country to become more involved with and thus influential on the global economic stage.
I. Brazil's Significance in the World Economy
Brazil is a very large country which has enjoyed political and economic stability and an increasingly favorable external environment during the past two decades, but its economic Its impressive geographical and economic size is indisputable: Brazil is the world's fifthlargest country in terms of territorial extension, coming after Russia, China, the United States and Canada; the fifth most populous country, surpassed only by China, India, the United
States and Indonesia; and in terms of the value-added of its economic output, adjusted for international differentials in purchasing power, it is the seventh-largest economy, after the United States, China, India, Japan, Germany and Russia.
However, despite these oft-cited headline indicators, Brazil casts a much smaller shadow when put in its proper context. The country's extensive land area (8.5 million square kilometers), as continental-sized as it is, represents but 6½ percent of the world's total, and includes just five percent of the planet's arable land. 2 Its territory is relatively lightly settled, such that Brazil's nearly 200 million residents account for less than three percent of the world's total population, significantly less than China's more than 19 percent and India's 17½ percent shares of total. Brazil's production of goods and services is likewise valued at less than three percent of the world's total, as opposed to the United States which accounts for nearly 20 percent and China almost 15 percent of global output. Moreover, Brazil remains a particularly inward-looking economy even in comparison with other large, continental-sized nations, which also tend to be less open than medium-sized economies. In countries such as Canada, Mexico and Russia, exports of goods and services are equivalent to at least 30 percent of their GDP; in Indonesia and South Africa, exports represent more than one-quarter of their GDP; and in India and Turkey, the export sector accounts for over one-fifth of GDP. In Brazil, in contrast, exports of goods and services represented less than 13 percent of GDP during 2008-12. 4 Mineral, agricultural and other primary products account for over half of Brazil's total exports, with many products that are classified as "manufactured" actually involving the processing of raw materials; for example, exports of orange juice are counted as manufactured goods. It is estimated that the proportion of total Brazilian exports embodying "high technology" has decreased from over ten percent of total in 2000 to five percent by 2010 (Canuto 2013) . The share of manufactured goods incorporating these high technologies, in turn, has likewise shrunk from roughly one-fifth of total manufactures in 2001 to less than one-tenth by 2011. 5 Even export goods incorporating low levels of technology slid from over 13 percent to under ten percent of total exports between 2000 and 2010. And this decrease in the content of technology in Brazilian exports was not the result of the intervening boom in commodity sales abroad; rather, it reflected modest growth in exports of manufactured goods embodying technology (Canuto et al. 2013) .
Brazilian exports are also characterized by the fact that they involve a relatively small proportion of imported inputs, and this is because Brazil is only marginally integrated into global production chains. For instance, estimates of the contribution of offshored intermediate inputs to the production of goods that are then exported show that Brazil is one of the most self-sufficient -some would say disconnected -of nations, with no more than one-tenth of the value-added of its exports incorporating foreign-made inputs. This very low share compares to more than one-fifth of export value-added in the case of Canada and India, and about one-third of same in China and Mexico. 6 Indeed, Brazil has served as a platform for national and multinational producers to satisfy the needs of the large (and relatively protected) domestic market, or else as a platform to export primary and manufactured goods made almost entirely in Brazil. The resulting selfsufficiency has contributed to Brazil's relative isolation from the world's multiplying production chains, and thus to the country's relatively low international economic profile.
Brazil also cuts a very marginal figure in terms of international financial, and not merely trade, connections. To begin with, the local currency, the Real (BRL), is hardly traded in the international currency markets. According to the latest and most authoritative survey of currency turnover in the world, the BRL figured in 0. According to a comprehensive survey of recipient countries, Brazil's foreign direct investments around the world (namely, investments entailing at least a ten-percent ownership stake) were estimated at about $100 billion as of end-2012, and foreign portfolio investments at the equivalent of $22 billion. To put them in proper perspective, these components of Brazil's international assets were 0.38 percent and 0.05 percent, respectively, of the world total of such cross-border investments. 10 In other words, Brazil's multinational companies and investments may have expanded a great deal abroad in the past decade, but they represent a small dot in the huge universe of cross-border direct and portfolio investing.
In terms of the international liabilities owed by the Brazilian public and private sectors to foreign direct and portfolio investors, and also to foreign banks and suppliers, these amounted to an estimated $1½ trillion as of the end of 2012. This figure is likewise more Brazil's footprint on the world economic stage is also light because its performance has been mixed and generally unimpressive. In the long period from 1980 through 2012, per capita incomes in Brazil, measured on an inflation-adjusted basis, increased by a total of 34 percent.
The economy actually experienced a contraction in per capita GDP in 12 out of the 33 years, or in more than one-third of the time elapsed. 
II. Brazil's Economic Statecraft
Brazil came to recognize during the 1980s the futility of autarchy and the limits of state-led, import-substituting industrialization, and it has since sought a "middle way" between the continuity of past nationalist policies and the neoliberal alternative that became fashionable in much of Latin America -never mind in the former Communist countries, most of which have embraced capitalism with gusto.
In terms of its economic statecraft -namely, the harnessing of global economic forces to advance Brazil's foreign policy, and the use of foreign policy tools to further the country's economic potential -the political and business elites in Brazil have responded to the centrifugal forces of economic globalization through a commitment to multilateralism. At the same time, however, they have responded to the centripetal forces of regionalization through commitments to Mercosul, and to a lesser extent to Portuguese-speaking Africa. 17
These two commitments have been supplemented as of late by a new version of statefostered economic development known as "neo-developmentalism," the term coined by
Brazilian economist and former policymaker Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira to define a 21 stcentury alternative to the "Washington Consensus" orthodoxy that is supposed to be an Brazil has long sought recognition of its perceived importance in the world, first and foremost by attempting to become a permanent member of League of Nation's Executive
Committee and then of the United Nations Security Council (Fishlow 2011, 181) . The point has been included in virtually all bilateral diplomatic agendas and mentioned in most presidential statements during or at the conclusion of meetings with other heads of state. In order to obtain support for this cause, Brazil has offered concessional loans, many of which went unpaid and had to be forgiven as of late, and has promised increased technical 17 An expansion of Brazilian exports to and investment in Africa in the past decade has been promoted to a large extent by Brazilian government loans to African importers and borrowers, channeled mainly via PROEX, Brazil's equivalent of the U.S. Export-Import Bank, and also by BNDES, the giant state-owned development bank which has no parallel in the United States. An unknown proportion of these loans are of dubious quality, and it is estimated that more than $1 billion in loans to African obligors have already had to be written off (World Bank/IPEA 2011, 99 , and Pereira da Costa and da . Our focus here is on Mercosul, and not on Brazil's initiatives in Africa.
cooperation to a variety of governments in Africa and Latin America. Indeed, it was to boost Brazil's case for membership in the Security Council that Brasilia decided to lead the U.N.
Stabilization Mission in Haiti, with the mobilization of important military, humanitarian, and other resources starting in 2004.
As of yet, Brazil has very little to show for all of its time and effort spent on the United Nations objective: the country's consolation prize has been frequent selection for temporary membership in the Security Council -and that is all. In general, the countries of Latin
America have not supported Brazil in this quest, favoring a rotation system whereby the region would always be represented (Turcotte 2008, 804) . Nevertheless, it is still the case that "Brazil's diplomatic and military establishment sees winning a permanent chair in the Security Council, even without veto power, as a desirable symbol of the country's status as a major world player" (de Almeida 2009, 176) .
Brazil has also long pursued the resolution of world problems through multilateral approaches to economic development, international trade, global warming, and international security issues. For example, Brazil and other developing countries became influential voices in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations that was launched in 1986 under the aegis of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the predecessor of the WTO, the World Trade Organization). Brazil also played an important role in the start of the Doha Round of 2001, the latest -and so far incomplete -attempt to curb protectionism affecting trade in agriculture, services and intellectual property. Among developing countries, Brazil and India have been heavily involved in guiding the agenda and negotiations (Fishlow 2011, 168-73 In the last several decades, Brazil has also supplemented its allegiance to multilateralism with a commitment to regional economic projects in South America and in Portuguese-speaking Africa.
In the mid-1980s, a relationship blossomed between Brazil and Argentina as both countries celebrated the restoration of democracy and the end of a military-era nuclear development race, and as both found themselves coping with a heavy legacy of government indebtedness, galloping inflation, and lack of access to foreign capital. Presidents José Sarney and Raúl
Alfonsín grew close as each experimented with unconventional stabilization plans (the Cruzado Plan and the Austral Plan, respectively) and toyed with the idea of a unified response to foreign bank and official creditors. Once both of these plans failed to vanquish hyperinflation, and more orthodox approaches had to be embraced, Brazil and Argentina engaged in coincidental trade-liberalization initiatives during 1988-89, whereby tariff walls were cut in half. This is what made it possible for their successors, Presidents Fernando
Collor and Carlos Menem, to enter into an alliance whereby tariff levels would be lowered further only for intra-regional trade (Fishlow 2011, 141-3 23 An early empirical study found that Mercosur was not internationally competitive in sectors where intra-regional trade grew most rapidly. "Domestic producers reoriented exports to local markets, presumably in order to charge the higher prices associated with the most restrictive trade barriers. This reduced the potential exports of third countries to Mercosur and under many circumstances may have reduced their welfare relative to an equivalent nondiscriminatory trade liberalization" (Yeats 1988, 25-6 Perceptions of Brazil among international economic and political elites are not helped by some of the questionable company the country has chosen to keep. And the most dubious relationships are turning out to be those that Brazil has cultivated with Argentina and Venezuela. During the past decade, both those countries have been run by increasingly authoritarian governments that have mismanaged their economies, discouraging investment and disregarding property and contractual rights through high-profile nationalizations, discriminatory taxes, and suffocating controls on consumer prices, utility rates, foreign trade and capital movements. In both Buenos Aires and Caracas, governments have undermined fundamental institutions like the judiciary, the press, the central bank, labor unions, business associations, and civil society generally through acts of intimidation and abuse of power.
Surely it is awkward for Brazil to be -and to be perceived to be -a partner and supporter of decadent regimes which are a reminder of Brazil's own dark days of authoritarian rule and economic mismanagement, mainly from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s.
Besides, Argentina's latest experiment with populism and nationalism, in particular, has had an increasingly deleterious impact on Brazil. Beyond the impact on bilateral trade and tourism of restrictions on imports and controls on access to foreign exchange, there is the because their eventual successors will face a damning legacy of economic, political and social woes that will take years to repair.
26 See "Múltis brasileiras perdem ânimo com o país e investimento desaba," Valor Econômico, August 26, 2013, available at www.valor.com.br/brasil/3246254/multis-brasileiras-perdem-animo-com-o-pais-e-investimentodesaba#ixzz2v6XHdFBd. 27 See "Venezuela deve US$ 2 bi a empreiteiras brasileiras," Valor Econômico, March 5, 2014, available at www.valor.com.br/internacional/3450136/venezuela-deve-us-2-bi-empreiteiras-brasileiras#ixzz2v6XvqKjQ. 28 Regional trade arrangements cannot flourish in the face of high levels of macroeconomic instability -exchange-rate instability, in particular. In practice, this means adopting sound monetary policies backed by a clear and coherent operating strategy, such as inflation targeting and central bank independence, backed by a serious commitment to prudent fiscal and financial policies (Eichengreen 2004, 22 Union, and all but Mexico also with the most important countries in Asia. They also have 29 An important objective is poverty reduction on the basis of employment growth rather than government handouts. Empirical studies simulating the potential effect of liberalized trade in Brazil illustrate that while protectionism favors capital-intensive manufacturing relative to production in agriculture and manufacturing that is intensive in unskilled labor, trade liberalization raises the return to unskilled labor relative to capital and helps the poor disproportionately. "The percentage increase in the incomes of the poorest households is three to four times greater than the average percentage increase in income for the economy as a whole" (Harrison et al. 2004, 314 The Pacific Alliance members want to connect themselves with each other and also with a number of economies in Asia that are looking for reliable partners for their global supply chains. Brazil has so far shown no interest in joining this group, and yet the country must become more integrated into the world. Otherwise, Brazilian companies will not be able to generate the kind of high-quality jobs that depend neither on the ups and downs of commodity prices nor on the elimination of distortions and restrictions to trade in agricultural products.
There is also the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which involves the United States plus eleven other countries from Australia and Canada to Japan and Vietnam, including Chile, Peru and Mexico. It is looking like the most important economic initiative to unite the Americas with South-East Asia, and Korea may well join the group in the near future.
35 See The Pacific Alliance, available at http://alianzapacifico.net/en/observer-states-of-the-alliance-key-companions-inthe-process-of-regional-integration.
The countries in the TPP share a commitment to concluding an ambitious agreement that will address many of the issues that have proven too difficult to resolve during the Doha Round, like rules for free trade in services and technology. As of early 2014, they had gone through nearly 20 negotiating rounds, making significant progress on an accelerated track toward conclusion of a comprehensive agreement in 2013. 36 However, Brazil has likewise expressed no interest in joining this group, even though it will become the largest in the world, because it will include countries representing about 40 percent of global GDP. In choosing a strategic partner from the "First World," Brazil should certainly consider the potential advantages of gaining instant global recognition by entering into a partnership with the United States. This is a highly controversial -even heretical -proposition among intellectual elites and political leaders in Brazil who have long sought to keep the United States as far away as possible. However, the time has come to recognize the United States has changed a great deal in recent years. It no longer has a hegemonic project for Latin America, and it recognizes that every country in the hemisphere is different and deserves to be respected as such. The United States appears ready to have a mature relationship with
Brazil with an agenda that is very broad, and not confined merely to the prevention of terrorism or the control of drug trafficking.
The time is ripe for Brazil to change course and aim high.
